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FOOD  STRATEGIES 
A  NEW  FORM  OF  COOPERATION  BETWEEN  EUROPE  AND  THE  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  THIRD 
WORLD 
=========================================================================== 
"Our  aim is not  the  structure we  are 
setting up  but  the people  whom  this 
structure is intended to serve" 
Edgard Pisani,  addressing the 
European Parliament. 
In less than twenty years'  time - by the year 2000  - Rwanda  will have had 
to double  its agricultural production in order to be  able  to feed its 
entire population.  How  will it manage  to do  so? 
This  example  - it is just one  of many  in the Third World  - shows  that the 
question  we  shall have  to face by the  end  of the  twentieth  century will be 
whether  we  have  made  it possible for  the developing countries to feed 
their populations themselves. 
In most  cases,  they are  capable  of  doing so.  But  they must  be  given the 
means  of exploiting their full potential - and besides,  if more  and better 
food is to be  produced,  the peasant  must  want  to make  it happen. 
The  facts are  disquieting: 
(i)  The  state of food  supplies in the Third World,  and especially in 
Africa,  far from  improving in recent years,  has become  even worse. 
(ii) The  way  things are  going,  the  situation will be  even  more  disastrous 
in twenty years'  time. 
The  policies implemented by Third World  governments hitherto and the aid 
which  the rich countries have  contributed in support  of these policies 
have not  been what  was  required.  The  mistakes  add  up  to millions of human 
lives,  so  it is not  a  matter of sorting out the  good  from  the bad aspects, 
or of taking a  figure  from  a  set  of statistics to  show  that  "when  all is 
said and done  ••• 
11  or "compared with the  others  •••"  such  and  such is the 
case. 
Why  not  just admit  that  the  methods  used were  not necessarily the  right 
one·s?  Tf they -bad been,  it would have  shown. 
Some  of the efforts made  have  been very substantial - but  they have not 
all been  channelled in the  same  direction,  and have  sometimes  cancelled 
one  another out. 
It is no  long possible to continue working in this uncoordinated way.  It 
is not  a  matter of changing policy,  but  of working out  a  logical 
development  pattern. 
That  is the  aim of the  "Food  Strategies" which  the European Community 
is drawing up  with certain African countries. ==============================~======~=====================~================ 
FACTS  AND  FIGURES 
============================================================================ 
The  food  situation is critical in most  African countries owing to the  lack 
of progress in socio-economic  development  in general  and rural development 
in particular:  that is the  starting point  for  any reflection on  the 
subject. 
A few  figures  illustrate this situation: 
(i) In Africa,  per capita food  crop production fell by an average  of 
1.2%  a  year  in the  seventies; 
{ii) Per capita agricultural production,  which  during the  sixties had 
remained  constant,  fell  even more  rapidly by an  average  of  1.4% 
a  year. 
(iii) In some  twenty African countries,  the average  growth  of ~ 
capita gross national product  did not  exceed  1%  a  year over the 
period 1970-75.  In fifteen countries,  there was  even negative 
growth. 
The  inhabitants of  the African countries  signatory to the  Lome  Convention 
do  not  have  the daily Jalorie  intake which  every human  being requires.  On 
average  they get  only  93.6% of what  they need  and there has been no 
improvement  in this situation over the  last decade.  Obviously,  these 
percentages vary greatly from  one  region to another:  while  they are 
better - but still inadequate - in coastal West  Africa, East Africa and 
Southern Africa  (98-99%),  they drop to  9.~% in central Africa and are as 
low as 85%  in the  Sahel countries. 
It should also  be  stressed that within the  same  country  low-income  groups 
living in the  towns  suffer more  from  malnutrition than  groups with 
comparable  incomes  living in the  country.  Given Africa's rapid urban 
growth rate, this fact  becomes  very  important.  Between  1950  and  1975 
the African countries'  urban population increased almost  fourfold  and  a 
further  increase  on  the  same  scale  is predicted by the year  2000.  By 
then,  30%  of Africa's population  should be  living in the towns.  What 
are they to  live  on? 
This question is all the  more  pressing since  urbanization has  changed 
consumer habits and  imported cereals are  gradually replacing local ones. 
The  result  of the  reduction in per capita availabilities of food  in 
African countries has been: 
(i) 
(ii) 
a  drop  in average per capita consumption of certain basic foodstuffs: 
an average  10%  drop  compared with average  consumption ten years agoj 
an  increase  in imports  of basic foodstuffs.  In ten years,  cereals 
imports have  doubled and now  amount  to  11m  tonnes.  Between  1969-71 
and  1978-80,  cereal  imports by the African countries signatory to 
the  Lome  Convention rose  from  2.3m  tonnes to  5o7m  tonnes  (the -2-
proportion of rice  in these  imports fell over the  same  period from 
26%  to  23%). 
For Africa as a  whole,  cereal  imports  should double  between  1980  and  1985. 
As  a  result,  the African countries'  cereals bill will probably rise to 
~6  000,  which  is about  a  fifth of their export  earnings. 
Lastly,  a  significant increase  should be noted in purchases  of other 
foodstuffs- oils and fats,  milk products,  meat,  etc. - and African 
countries are  expected to have  a  shortfall in fish in the near future. 







Middle  East 
Far East 
Other  dev.  countries 






















Per capita food 






















FROM  THE  NOBEL  PRIZE  WINNERS'  MANIFESTO  'I'O  THE  FOOD  STRATEGY  VENTURE 
~===~==================================~===========c=======================c 
"We  the  undersigned,  men  and women  of science,  letters,  men  and women  of 
peace,  of different  religions,  history and  culture  •••  we  appeal to all 
men  and women  of goodwill,  appeal  to the  powerful  and to the humble  to 
act  ••• for tens of  millions of people  on  the  point  of dying from hunger 
and underdevelopment  to be  restored to life ••• 
It is essential that  a  suitable method  and  procedure  from  the  many  possible 
ones that exist  or can be  imagined,  should be  devised,  adopted and 
implemented  immediately  ••• 
It is essential that the highest  international authorities,  the 
governments,  the people  ••• 
Now  is the time to act,  now  is the time  to create,  now  is the  time  for  us 
to live  in a  way  that will  give life to others." 
On  24  June  1981,  53  Nobel  Prize winners  issued this manifesto as an appeal 
to the whole  world.  The  members  of the European  Parliament  - spurred on 
by Marco  Pannella,  leader of the Italian Radicals - were  among  the first 
to want  action to be  taken  in response  to this appeal. -3-
On  30  September  1981,  Parliament  adopted a  resolution in Strasbourg 
requesting the  Commission to draw  up  an  emergency plan to  save  at  least 
five  million people from  hunger  and  malnutrition in 1982,  and  consequently 
to provide for  a  special  supplementary budget  in  1982  of 5  OOOm  ECU  {see 
Annex). 
The  European Community  has not  hitherto had cause to be  ashamed  of what  it 
has  done  to help poor  countries.  Since  it was  set up  in 1957,  it has 
always  involved the Third World  in its activities.  The  Lome  Convention 
(signed and later renewed by the Ten  and nearly sixty countries in Africa, 
the Caribbean  and Pacific)  is still held up  as a  model  of its kind. 
Europe  could therefore have  continued in the  same  direction - and who 
would have reproached it? 
However,  the realization that the food  situation in the developing 
countries and  more  especially in Africa was  worsening - and  a  political 
incentive,  namely the appeal by the Nobel  Prize  winners and  the European 
Parliament  Resolution - compelled the Commission  to devise  guidelines 
for a  new  policy. 
On  2  October  1981,  the  Commission  drew  up  a'~lan of action against hunger 
in the world" based on  the following three types  of action: 
(i)  emergency  operations  designed to deal with  the  most  urgent  problems 
by providing immediate  food aid; 
(ii) operations with  specific themes  designed mainly to  safeguard the 
developing countries'  natural assets; 
(iii) the formulation of food  strategies. 
The  debate  in the European  Parliament  was  a  lively one,  with those who 
favoured rapid,  exceptional action and the  immediate  injection of 
substantial funds  up  against those  who  advocated a  longer-term policy.  It 
was  concluded as follows by Edgard Pisani,  the European Commissioner 
responsible for  development  co0peration:  "The  Commission  considers that 
hunger will not  be  vanquished by temporary expedients,  but  rather by a 
process of economic  development,  which will be  slow and difficult, 
because  development  is not  just building roads,  dams,  hospitals,  schools, 
irrigation systems and factories:  it is all those things,  but it is first 
and  foremost  the mobilization and  the  organization of an  entire nation 
which wishes finally to take in hand its economic  and  social destiny after 
it has taken its political destiny in hand.  Development  is not  simply 
transferring technology  and technical assistance;  it is the acquisition 
by the poorest  countries of the ability to develop techniques suited to 
their own  needs,  to train men  capable  of governing them,  of administering 
their affairs,  of managing their economy  and of guiding their efforts." 
:::a:::;a::c::== ==::::: :-=:::::.=  ~=~===  ~===:========  =cc:c=========  t::====== ==========t:: =============  ==== 
THE  FOOD  STRATEGIES:  A BLUE  PRINT  FOR  SUCCESS 
==========================~====~============================================ 
Sixty per cent  of the population of the Third World  are peasants.  Seventy 
per cent  of the population of Africa  are  peasants.  Eighty-seven per cent 
of the  inhabitants of Mali  are peasants,  and 90%ofthe inhabitants of 
Rwanda.  And  yet ••• 
•••  And  yet these peasants,  as creatures of flesh  and blood,  not the 
theoretical and abstract  creations of  ideological  speeches,  have  been 
neglected by development  activities - and need one  mention those African -4-
countries which happened to be  endowed  with considerable  mineral wealth 
and which have  ruined their agriculture,  and consequently their entire 
economw,  as a  result.  Mines  are  often run as a  kind of enclave  outside 
the  economw  as a  whole,  and while  they are  owned  by the  state,  the nation 
does not  benefit  from them.  But  when  agricultural projects have  been 
implemented,  usually with the help of rich countries,  how  often has the 
essential question been  forgotten:  will it encourage  the peasant  to 
produce  more? 
Unless this question is asked and an attempt  made  to find a  satisfactory 
answer to it, the peasant will not  produce  enough.  It is as simple  as 
that. 
(.i)  He  does not  produce  enough  for himself.  In rural Africa, 
self-sufficiency is not  always attained. 
(ii) He  does  not  produce  enough  for his family.  Given the rise in the 
population,  food production will be  more  and  more  inadequate  and 
the peasants will have to abandon their land for the towns. 
(iii) He  does not  produce  enough  for the  rest of the population - that  is, 
for those already living in the  towns and all those who  will be 
joining them. 
What  will the towns  of the Third World be  like  in the year  2000? 
It is not  hard to work  out  the  consequences:  malnutrition,  constant 
hunger,  death  in many  cases,  with  food aid from  the rich countries and 
commercial  food  imports  the only way  out. 
Are the Third World  countries therefore going to  continue to  import  what 
they can produce?  Would  it not be better to buy  oil, fertilizers and 
machinery rather than cereals?  Especially as these  imported agricultural 
products  only  serve to disrupt their agricultural economies  even further. 
The  food  strategies'  number  one  objective  is to establish conditions 
which  will enable  the peasant  to produce  more  and better food. 
11A food  strategy
11
,  declared Edgard Pisani on  16  June to the European 
Parliament,  "must  start with the adoption by  governments  of rigorous 
economic policies.  This  means  that they must  decide to  give  farmers,  and 
the vast  number  of  small  farmers,  even more  than commercial  undertakings, 
an  incentive to produce  foodstuffs by offering to buy  them at prices 
which offer the prospect of a  profit,  and on  that basis we  can hope  to 
guide production using the vast  number  of means  open  to us.u 
It is therefore a  matter initially of identifying and taking into account 
all the many  aspects of the food  problem,  from the producer  to the final 
consumer,  and of integrating them  into a  coherent  development  policy. 
This would  provide  a  framework  for  organizing better coordination between 
domestic policies and contributions from  abroad and would be  a  step 
towards better use  of all available resources. -5-
1.  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  MUST  FORMULATE  THEIR  OWN  STRATEGIES 
This  is not  an easy task,  so  great is the overlap between the many 
different factors  of development  and their interdependence.  It is first 
of all necessary to make  an honest  diagnosis - the success of the entire 
strategy depends  on it.  Thenobjectives have to be set,  and policies and 
programmes  adopted to attain them. 
For example:  the diagnosis reveals that among  the many  constraints on 
a  country is a  lack of arable  land with all its consequences,  namely 
erosion and excessive pressure  on  the  land under  cultivation.  The 
implications of this are that the land should be  made  as fertile as 
possible, all available  land worked,  measures taken to combat  erosion,  and 
production  systems  organized. 
Since  the purpose  of the  strategy is to organize agriculture  so that it 
meets the population's requirements,  the  objective is therefore to make  the 
land  more  productive  and to diversify crop and livestock products.  The 
policy will be  to  promote  production and the efficient use  of inputs.  The 
programmes will be  geared to acquiring selected seeds,  tools, fertilizers, 
and  soil ameliorators.  This  example,  which is incomplete  since it does not 
include all the  other constraints,  could be  extended. 
2 o  THE  PEASANTS  MUST  BE  ENCOURAGED  TO  PRODUCE 
This approach to production should be based essentially on  market  forces. 
In order to increase production to any  substantial degree and  on  a 
lasting basis, the policy to be  implemented must  give  producers the 
incentives and  security they need in order to aooept  a  system of production 
not  aimed at  mere  subsistence.  If prices are too  low,  the peasants will be 
discouraged from producing any more  than they need themselves.  Only the 
prospect  of obtaining an  income  from their surplus production will make  the 
African peasant  move  out  of the vicious circle of  subsistence farming.  The 
peasant  must  have  reasons for producing and be certain he  can sell his 
produce. 
Are  farmers  in the Third World  prepared to operate  in a  market  econo~ 
system such as this?  Are  they not  going to continue with their old habits 
of subsistence farming?  Although there is a  risk of this happening in the 
case of the older generation,  it is only slight in the  case  of young people. 
If they receive attractive prices for their produce  and if they find it 
useful to have  a  money  income  - because if there  is nothing to buy,  why 
want  money?  - they will  increase production.  Will they increase it too 
much?  Hardly. 
3.  THIS  INCENTIVE  IS NOT  ENOUGH 
Increased production stands a  chance  of being maintained only if supplementary 
measures are taken to back up  the process  set  in train. 
"An  increase  in production" wrote the Commission  in a  paper intended for 
the Development  Ministers of the Ten  "presupposes an equivalent  increase in 
storage  capacity (at farm,  village,  regional or national level) or an 
adequate  procurement  system;  alongside  the will to produce  more  there  must 
be the possibility of placing at the producers'  disposal,  when  needed,  the 
required agricultural inputs;  the gradual integration of the producers 
into a  trading economlf  must  go  hand in hand with the  establishment  of 
suitable rural credit facilities;  growing mechanization must  be 
accompanied by the setting-up of improved maintenance  facilities,  eta." -6-
If farmers  produce more  and if storage facilities enable them  to sell some 
of their surpluses,  they can use the money  they obtain in this way  to 
improve their production system  further.  However,  the necessary 
distribution system does not yet exist,  or at any rate is not  sufficiently 
operational.  In order to form  part  of a  more  modern  economic  chain,  the 
farmer must  have received training,  hence the need for  extension services. 
Similarly,  the capacity for  saving may  be deflected from  its purpose if a 
system of agricultural credit is not  gradually set up,  not  to mention the 
need for  infrastructure,  equipment  for the villages,  and the setting up 
of small businesses. 
"And  if, as all the evidence  suggests,  rising prices result in a 
corresponding increase in production,"  as Edgard Pisani told the European 
Parliament,  "we  must,  on  the  one  hand,  see that we  have the physical means 
of storing farm  surpluses,  in the villages and in the cities,  and  on the 
other hand,  we  must  see that money  is available to buy up  the surplus 
produce that  comes  to market.  To  do  that, the government  in question 
needs budgetary support  in order to build,  or have built, silos,  and to 
make  seasonal  loans,  and it needs technical and financial  support to see 
that the produce is  marketed. If all that is accomplished - and it will be 
farmers will have money.  They  will be prepared to buy manure,  pesticides 
and tools and to build themselves modest  houses in which  to live.  They 
will need better equipped villages and paths to transport products along. 
Very  soon,  they will also need the help  of competent  advisory officers, 
present  on  the  spot  and ready to help them." 
Overall  development will therefore come  from  greater readiness to produce. 
4.  AID  OR  A PACT? 
"But  how  much  extra money  are you going to give us?n 
"None.  Because,  supposing I  don't give you  any,  are you going to let 
yourselves die of hunger?" 
This was  the  jesting way  in which Edgard Pisani replied to members  of the 
Kenyan  Government.  It is obvious that Europe will use all the means 
available to it to help  those  countries which  have  chosen to  seek its help 
in attaining the objectives set by their food  strategies.  Pisani's answer 
shows,  however,  that the  key to success lies above all with the Africans 
themselves.  It is for them  to define their food  strategies - although they 
may  have to request  external assistance to do  so - and for  them  to find 
ways  of motivating the population. 
From  that  stage onwards,  the rich countries can provide constructive 
criticism and  support. 
A pact will be concluded between a  developing country and those which have 
chosen to help it;  under this pact the country will be helped to overcome 
the difficulties it will  encounter.  The  country must,  however,  observe the 
objectives and rules which it laid down  when  formulating its food  strategy. 
Otherwise,  the pact will lose its justification.  This method  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows: 
"We  have  concluded a  contract.  You  apply a  given measure  and we  shall 
give you  our  support.  You  slacken in your efforts to give up,  and  we  shall 
do  the  same."  It amounts  to co-piloting an  experiment  to ensure its success, 
and this will to  succeed is the main bond between the two  partners.  This 
system  of joint administration presupposes flexibility on  both sides so  that 
the action taken can be adjusted in line with changing circumstances. 
Does  this approach appear neocolonialist.  Is it neocolonialist to establish 
clearly with a  partner the objectives of joint action and  how  they are to 
be achieved? -7-
And  is it neocolonialist to put a  stop to operations if the other side is 
not  honouring its contract? 
Co-piloting of food  strategies is perhaps the most  advanced  form  of 
cooperation between rich and  developing countries,  since for once  the latter 
are considered not as recipients of aid but  as real partners - i.e. 
responsible for the  success of an  operation undertaken  jointly. 
It is significant that the European Community  should have been the first to 
propose this step. 
=====c===================================================================== 
WHY  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY? 
=========================================================================== 
Europe is therefore the first to start adopting this blueprint for  success, 
albeit tentatively.  Why? 
(i) Given the continuing failure of the Soviet Union to contribute to 
development  cooperation,  the rather embryonic  state of Japanese aid, 
and  the tendency of US  aid to be politically selective, Europe must 
face up  to its responsibilities vis-a-vis the Third World. 
(ii) These responsibilities are political and  economic.  Let us  forget 
the moral  aspect,  although it does have  a  role to play- after all, 
the  impact  of the  appeal by the Nobel  Prize winners and the 
information campaigns  on  hunger in the world certainly contributed 
to the food  strategies proposal.  But  leaving aside this moral  aspect, 
it must be realized that Europe  cannot live with a  politically 
unstable or - the two  are linked - economically weak  Africa. 
(iii) In the short term,  there are  some  who  could benefit from  this 
situation.  Via development  aid,  European firms  can sell their 
machines or products to poor countries,  which  also absorb  some  of  our 
agricultural  surpluses.  All is therefore for the best.  But  for how 
long?  Will  the hungry remain silent for  ever?  Will  they not call us 
to account  one  day? 
(iv)  Will European public opinion not  do  the same?  "If development  aid 
does not  do  any good,  since all the figures  show  that  the situation 
in the Third World  is going from  bad to worse,  why  bother to make  an 
effort,  why  not  channel  the money  spent  on it into our  own  development?" 
The  economic  crisis can  only add weight  to this kind of reasoning. 
(v)  In the long term,  Europe's real interest does not lie in having an 
African market that is "at its disposal" but in ensuring that Africa 
becomes  a  trading partner of  substance.  This will not  happen unless 
its development is comprehensive,  and  embraces  the entire population. 
If we  reflect upon the policy followed by the European Community  hitherto, 
we  can  see that the  food  strategies do  not  constitute a  complete break 
with its activities up  to now.  In many  w~s, they even  form  the 
culmination of those activitieso -8-
The  Community  has always  emphasized the contractual nature of its 
cooperation with the Third World- from  the signing in 1963  of the 
Yaounde  Convention with the eighteen Associated African States and 
Madagascar to the renewal,  in 1979,  of the  Lome  Convention with  over 
sixty African,  Caribbean and  Pacific States,  not  to mention the m~ 
agreements it has  concluded with the Mediterranean countries.  It has 
even gone  so far as to state when  the contract has not been fully 
honoured - the Commission  did  so  officially when  taking stock of the 
agreements with the Mediterranean countries. 
In the  case of the food  strategies this contract goes  even  further. 
- In recent years,  the  share of European aid  funds  earmarked for 
agriculture has increased steadily,  going up  from  16%  under the first 
European Development  Fund  (1958)  to over 39%  under the fifth Development 
Fund.  Within this percentage,  the  share  earmarked for crops for  export 
fell  from  45%  to  30%.  Between  1976  and 1980 over  2.5m  hectares  of land 
were planted with new  crops;  stock-farming,  fishing and forestry have 
been stepped up,  and many  projects of value to rural areas have been 
conducted in the spheres of training,  health,  and water  engineering 
infrastructure. 
Europe is also placing growing  emphasis  on  microprojects and integrated 
rural  development.  The  former are of particular benefit to the poorest 
sections of the rural population (irrigation,  storage of foodstuffs, 
building of schools,  dispensaries,  etc.).  The  latter focuses  on  the human 
factor in addition to the technical  and  economic  aspects of development. 
Through basic training,  campaigns  to eradicate certain diseases,  the use  of 
renewable  sources of energy  (such as solar energy,  etc.), the  improvement 
of seeds  and  fertilizers,  irrigation,  storage,  the processing and 
marketing of agricultural products,  yields are increased and dietary 
standards,  producer prices and  li,ring standards in general  are raised.  The 
setting up,  under the Lome  Convention,  of a  Technical Centre for 
Agricultural  and Rural Cooperation  should  enablH  technical  assistance, 
research and dissemination of know-how  to be  stepped up still further. 
- The  technical  and  financial aid which the Community  grants Mediterranean 
countries with which it has  concluded cooperation agreements is also 
channelled into agricultural development,  albeit to a  lesser extent  than 
in the  case of the ACP  countries.  The  recipient  countries have hitherto 
allocated  8%  of the grants of 18%  of the loans  from  the EEC  to the rural 
sector. 
-Almost 9o%  of the aid granted by the Community  to some  thirty 
non-associated countries in Asia,  Latin America  and Africa is allocated 
to agriculture.  The  emphasis is placed on  increasing production and  the 
availability of foodstuffs.  As  in the ACP  countries,  many  of the 
activities upstream and downstream  of the production stage involve 
welfare and educational back-up,  irrigation or storage infrastructure, 
processing and marketing structures,  rural  credit and  agricultural 
research.  Here too,  the trend is more  and more  towards integrated rural 
development  .. 
The  Community  cofinances many  projects with non-governmental  development 
aid organizations and  these projects focus mainly on  the poorest  sections 
of the Third World  population,  living largely in rural areas. 
Although  these efforts are very substantial,  in order to be  successful  they 
must  now  be backed up  by an  overall  strategy.  The  Community  has the 
wherewithal,  the experience and  the people required to help with  such  a 
strategy., -9-
=====~===================================================================== 
HOW  IS THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  GOING  TO  DO  THIS? 
=========================================================================== 
Edgard Pisani,  the Member  of the Commission  responsible for development 
cooperation,  has alrea4y visited five African countries to find out whether 
they were prepared to embark  with the European Community  on  the food 
strategy venture. 
Before an initial evaluation is made  of these meetings,  two  questions must 
be asked: 
What  means  does the European Community  have at its immediate disposal to 
support these countries'  efforts? 
Can  other developed countries join in the exercise? 
As  we  have  seen,  a  big financial  input is not the main prerequisite  for the 
success of the food  strategies.  The  main  factor is the motivation of the 
African peasant to produce more  and better food.  The  food  strategy 
contains the seeds of its own  success.  Europe will nevertheless conclude 
a  pact with those countries,  and while it will be demanding for them,  it 
will also be demanding for the Community  and its Member  States,  which will 
be called upon  to make  a  special effort along the following lines: 
(a)  they must  accept  an efficient  system of coordination; 
(b)  they must  be prepared for constant  adjustment  of the aid mechanisms  so 
that appropriate solutions can be  found  to specific questions arising 
as the strategy is implemented; 
(c)  they must  seek w~s of helping these countries to proceed through the 
various stages of the development  process  thus set in train. 
At  the  end of his first round  of visits (to Kenya,  Mali  and  Zambia), 
Mr Pisani  outlined in a  memo  to the Council  of Ministers initial steps 
which the  EEC  could take to  help  countries with a  food  strategy.  In his 
opinion,  it was  necessary: 
(i) to re-examine the indicative programmes  which are used to programme 
the aid from  the European Development  Fund to the countries signatory 
to the Lome  Convention; 
( ii) to use the counterpart  funds  from  food aid.  When  the Conununi ty sends 
foodstuffs to a  country,  to avoid disrupting local  economic  channels 
these products are not distributed free  of charge to the population 
apart from  in exceptional  cases.  The  funds  obtained in this way  are 
placed at the country's disposal; 
(iii) to use the "projects" component  of the transfers made  under the 
system for stabilizing export  earnings; 
(iv) to seek ways  of establishing lines of credit to support  or promote 
the  system  of national  and rural  credit, possibly through the use 
of European Investment Bank  facilities; 
(v)  to use  any additional  resources becoming available under the special 
programme  to combat  hunger in the world; 
(vi) to allocate or, if necessary,  re-allocate Member  States'  aid. 
The  point  of the  exercise is obviously not to place countries which  do  not 
undertake a  food  strategy,  or which  are not  earmarked by the Community  for 
assistance,  11at a  disadvantage",  but to  enable the Community  to obtain the 
resources  required to help  towards  the  success of the initial experiments. - 10-
The  Community  and its Member  states will perhaps not be the only 
11co-pilots11 
in these  food  strategy experiments.  A number  of developed countries have 
expressed their interest in this operation and  the Community  keeps them 
regularly informed of progress.  Contributions from  them would  increase 
the chances of success.  The  first batch of countries implementing food 
strategies are getting over  50%  of their aid from  the Community  and the 
Member  states alone.  If there were  to be other donors as well,  the 
capacity and  impact  would  be increased. 
~===a====================================================================a= 
AN  INITIAL  EXPERIMENT  WITH  FIVE  AFRICAN  COUNTRI:ES 
======================================================================~==== 
When  the idea of food  strategies was  launched,  a  large number  of African 
countries expressed interest. 
Three criteria were  adopted  by the  ComDdssion  for identifying the countries 
with which  a  start  could be made: 
( i) they had to be countries with a  large food  short'fall  i 
(ii) they had to have the capacity and  will to conduct  valid food 
strategies for themselves; 
(iii) they had to be receiving substantial aid from  the European  Community 
and its Member  states. 
Many  African countries met  the first and  third criterions.  The  question 
was  whether they were  prepared to formulate and  undertake a  food  strategy. 
The  Commission  chose  five  countries and  Mr  Pisani visited them  in order to 
take stock of the possibilities.  The  five countries are Mali,  Kenya, 
Zambia,  Rwanda  and  Tanzania. 
These  countries differ in many  ways  - in location,  language,  economic 
potential and  social organization.  It is interesting to note that the 
food  strategies can  be  implemented irrespective of a  country's socio-
political organization,  and  irrespective also of the legal  status of its 
farms.  There is just  one  condition,  namely that it must  be possible for 
the country's farms  to fit into a  trading system,  which is the foundation 
for  any prosperous agricultural economy. 
The  initial contacts have  been too brief for any definitive conclusions to 
be drawn  as yet;  the meetings were  designed mainly to  enable the  Communi ty1 s 
representatives to  explain the strategies more  fully and  allow the African 
authorities to provide a  better picture of their countries'  exact  situations. 
One thing is certain,  however.  The  five countries have clearly expressed 
their desire to conduct  a  voluntary food  policy.  Some  of them  have already 
embarked  on  such a  policy,  while others are about  to.  The  authorities 
with whom  meetings were  held were  also in agreement  with the new  approach 
proposed by the Community.  All this is of course  subject to certain 
provisos:  there are many  matters which  have to be clarified on  either side, 
and  many  questions still unsettled. 
The  process has nevertheless started - and in the manner  agreed,  i.e. with 
ongoing  cooperation between the Community  and  the countries concerned. -- II  -
======c==================================================================== 
MALI:  HELPING  TO  MAKE  ITS  EFFORTS  SUCCESSFUL 
=~============c============================================================ 
On  2  and  3  June  1982,  Commission  officials started their "food strategy" 
tour in Bamako.  Their meeting with the Malian authorities was  particularly 
encouraging,  since about  two  years ago  Mali  undertook a  policy of 
reorganizing its agriculture,  with development  based on  the traditional 
village communities and  on  a  progressive increase in the pricec paid to 
producers.  Since Mali  had  embarked  on  a  particular process itself,  the 
Commission  representatives had  to decide whether it should be helped to 
attain its objectives and,  if so,  they had to determine with the Mali 
authorities what  form  their cooperation ought to take. 
The  reorganization was  necessary.  Mali  is able to produce  enough  food  for 
its population -more than enough,  in fact -but as a  result of the climate 
and also for political reasons  a  food  shortfall was  tending to become  a 
permanent  feature. 
Largely owing  to the rivers Niger and  Senegal,  Mali  has great natural 
potential for producing cereals (it is the only country in this region of 
Africa where  cereals can  be  grown),  groundnuts,  fruit  and  vegetables,  and 
for  stock-farming and  fisheries.  The  country also has peasants,  stock-
farmers  and  fishermen  who  use traditional methods  and  have  a  wealth of 
experience acquired over many  years  and  an undoubted ability to adapt. 
It has nevertheless suffered very marked  failures in its attempts to develop 
arable and  stock-farming.  They  do  not  stem  from  the climate alone,  and 
the consequences have affected the country's economy  as a  whole.  The  food 
shortfalls have tended to become  permanent  and the country now  depends 
systematically on  food  aid  from  the developed countries.  These  poor 
results have had a  domino  effect,  impoverishing the other sectors of the 
economy,  reducing the tax base,  worsening the financial  imb'3.l.ances  and 
creating increasingly serious social tension. 
In order to get  out  of this impasse,  the Malian authorities decided to 
change direction.  Certain measures  have already been taken,  the most 
important  being the reorganization of the cereals market.  This operation 
is to take five years,  and is based on  higher producer prices,  consumer 
subsidies  and  the liberalization of trade.  These  measures have already 
produced results:  the production of millet,  sorghum  and  maize  exceeded 
1 million t  in 1981,  as against  800  000  t  in 1980.  F'or  the first  time in 
years the towns  have been properly supplied,  either via private channels 
or by  the  "Office etatique"  (state board),  which no  longer monopolizes 
marketing. 
The  reform of the cereals market  is only a  first  step,  one  factor in the 
food  strategy which Mali  is in the process of elaborating.  This  strategy 
has three main  objectives: 
(i)  To  ensure that the population is  better fed,  in terms of both 
quantity and quality. 
(ii) To  avoid having to choose between importing foodstuffs  and  importing 
energy or  equipment. 
(iii) To  enable the population to  at~ in the productive regions. 
Since they  supply over half the aid Mali  receives and  most  of that is 
channelled into agriculture,  the European  Community  and its Member  States 
have the means  to contribute towards the success of this strategy --12-
especially as the Malian authorities have  decided to take the co-piloting 
idea right to its logical  conclusion.  Indeed,  the Head  of state, 
General Moussa  Traore,  went  so  far as to  suggest  during his meeting with 
Edgard  Pisani  that  an  "inspector"  should be appointed by  the Commission  to 
correct  any mistakes made I 
11If",  as the Commission  wrote in the report it put  before the Council, 
"Mali  confirms that it is resolved to maintain and develop this policy,  and 
if it enters into an agreement  with the Community  on  support  for tbi  s 
policy,  the Member  States  (and any  other donors  joining in the Gxercise) 
will have  to indicate their readiness to  give it as much  support  as possible, 
in line with what  will have been  agreed  by  the Government." 
In order to  ensure that  the process gets off the ground,  and  to keep  a 
constant  look-out  for problems to be solved as they arise,  a  coordination 
and  evaluation  structure will have  to be  set up  which will enable the 
necessary checks  and  adjustments to be made. 
The  trend towards  increased production,  induced by  a  policy of more 
attractive prices for the peasants,  must  be backed up  by  a  package of 
measures and  programmes: 
(i) once they have  succeeded in producing more,  the peasants  should also 
be able to sell their surplus without  the danger of its being 
"confiscated"; 
(ii) labour productivity must  be improved,  since a  lack of inputs, 
equipment,  training or credit  could cancel out  the incentive to 
produce.  It is necessary to want  to produce more,  but it is also 
necessary to be able to do  so; 
(iii) uses  should be  found  for the  savings induced by the increase in 
marketed output; 
(iv) a  system of agricultural credit  should be introduced to facilitate 
the implementation of all these attendant  measures. 
===============================================================~=========== 
KENYA:  GETTING  BACK  TO  SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
========================================================~=====~============ 
Before 1970,  Kenya  was  not  only able to feed its population but  even 
produced exportable surpluses.  This  situation gradually deteriorated and 
once in the red,  the country had  to resort to imports and  food  aid.  The 
reasons  for this decline in production and the drop in the level of 
consumption  are manifold:  the drought  and the rise in the cost of imports, 
the population growth rate-at  4%  a  year one  of the highest in Africa - and 
lastly the decline in the amount  of good  land given over to food crops 
owing to  erosion,  the extension of the areas under cash crops,  and  the 
population drift to the towns. 
These  "natural" factors  do  not  explain everything,  however.  All  observers 
agree that the drop in production is also due  to a  number  of political 
errors:  an  inadequately planned and  diversified pricing policy,  the 
rigidity of the  semi-public marketing boards,  relative inefficiency and  a 
lack of coordination at administrative level. 
It would  seem  that,  in adopting its National Food  Policy in 1981,  Kenya 
understood the need to adopt  new  tactics in order to boost its agricultural 
production. 
The  scale of the aid granted by the Community  and its Member  States (which -1:1-
in 1979  and 1980  accounted.  for  5~  and  43%  respectively of the total aid 
received by Kenya)  gives them  an  important  strategic position in helping 
Kenya  to refine and develop this policy.  Its preparation does not  seem 
to have reached as advanced a  stage as in the case of Mali,  and  the various 
courses which the food  strategy could follow are still very vague. 
Where  the Kenyan  authorities would  like to receive Community  support  now  is 
in the following  spheres: 
{i) Marketing.  The  increased production that higher prices will generate 
should be marketable.  In order to make  this possible,  the Kenyan 
authorities are insisting on  the need to create substantial storage 
facilities  (for a  total of 200  000 t) and  on  building the rural tracks 
necessary for organized marketing. 
(ii) Establishment  of an  efficient credit  system. 
=======================================Q====================3============== 
ZAMBIA:  RESTORING  AGRICULTURE'S  ROLE 
===================~=======================================~=============== 
Of  the labour force,  65%  depends  on  agriculture,  but  contributes only 12% 
to the formation  of gross national product:  the explanation for the 
imbalance in the development  of Zambia's  economy  lies in these two  figures. 
The  Government's policy of making  agricultural development  subordinate to 
the interests of the mining  sector has reSlllted in the stagnation of 
agricultural production and hence  an increase in agricultural imports and 
heightened dependence  on  food  aid from  the developed countries. 
The  experts nevertheless consider that  Zambia has the potential to cover 
its domestic  cereals requirements and even produce  exportable surpluses. 
The  development  of stock-farming could also provide the population with an 
appreciable protein complement,  and  the conditions for grazing are very 
favourable. 
The  major difficulties encountered by Zambia' a  agriculture lie in the fact 
that the prices paid to producers are not attractive.  They  are uniform 
throughout the country,  whereas production costs,  and  in particular 
transport  costs,  vary greatly from  one  region to another. 
The  Government  has  already taken certain measures to make  prices more 
attractive,  particularly in the case of maize.  While  good  weather 
admittedly helped,  this policy produced reSlllts very quickly in the form 
of a  maize crop of 690  000 t  in 1981  (as against  330  000 and  382  000  t  in 
1978  and  1979  respectively),  enough to cover domestic demand. 
The  Zambian  Government  realized it had failed in agriculture.  In its 
ten-year (1980-1990)  Operation Food  Production programme,  it criticized 
past policy very severely and  laid down  the guidelines for  a.  more  coherent 
agricultural policy. 
The  Zambian  Government  seems  aware that the fu.ture  of agriculture cannot 
be assured by creating large state-owned farms  but that what  is needed is 
a  policy of remunerative prices.  They  have  expressed interest in 
participating in a  dynamic  production process.  A coherent  food strategy 
should also comprise the fo11')wing measures: - 14-
(i) Development  of food  crops other than maize  (manioc,  sorghum,  millet). 
Priority has hitherto been given to maize,  which has been marketed in 
the largest quantities despite the fact that  5o%  of the population 
lives off other crops. 
(ii) Coherent  policies as regards storage,  credit,  etc. 
Now  is a  particularly opportune time for the furopean  Community  to  support 
the elaboration and implementation of this policy (with its Member  states 
it accounts for over 50%  of the total aid granted to Zambia). 
Following Mr  Pisani's visit, an EEC-Zambia  Joint  Committee was  set up on 
24 June.  It set itself the objective of determining the present  production 
plans,  the constraints and the measures to be taken to overcome  them,  and 
also the role which external aid will  be  called upon  to play. 
The  Community's  support  should be channelled mainly into the following 
areas: 
rural extension  services; 
storage facilities for the surpluses  accumulated in normal years and 
setting up of buffer stocks at regional and national levels; 
measures to  encourage the prevention of wastage  (which in the case of 
maize  amounts to  5o%  of the crop in some  cases); 
the setting up of an  efficient credit  system geared to the requirements 
of small family holdings; 
applied research with a  view to improving productivity. 
==-======================================================================== 
RWANDA:  IMPROVING  ON  SUBSISTENCE  FARMING 
=========================================================================== 
"The balance is precarious and in danger of being completely upset not 
because of any particular weather conditions or institutional instability 
but  as  a  result of an  exceptional population density,  which in the end will 
render present  production methods useless...  This is the Rwandan 
Government's  own  diagnosis of the country's future as regards food  supplies. 
Rwanda's national output  has hitherto been sufficient to cover the country's 
food  requirements. 
From  1967  to 1979  food production increased,  but this balance may  be 
disrupted under the combined pressure of two  factors: 
(a)  The  limits of natural potential.  Land  is becoming  scarcer,  the soil 
is deteriorating (only 8%  of the potential is still unused),  and the 
tree cover is declining. 
(b)  Population growth.  The  present  population,  numbering 5.2 million, 
is growing at a  rate of 3.7%  a  year.  Elf  2005 it will have almost 
doubled to over  10 million.  Of this number,  40%  (as against  5%  at 
present) will live outside the primary agricultural sector.  Rwanda's 
population density is exceptionally high:  at  350 inhabitants per 
square kilometre of land sui  table for cultivation, it is the highest 
in Africa,  second only to the Nile Valley in Egypt.  Consequence:  if 
it is to continue to keep its population self-sufficient in food, 
Rwanda's  food  crop production needsto increase by more  than  3%  a  year, - 15-
which means  that the yield from  the land in use has to be doubled 
between now  and the year  2000. 
In order to make  this challenge a  little -but only a  little - less daunting, 
the Rwandese  authorities are planning the following measures: 
(a) 
(b) 
emigration to neighbouring countries: 
about  taking a  "colony" of possibly as 
gentle encouragement  - with no  element 
birth control. 
Tanzania has been contacted 
many  as a  million people; 
of compulsion - in the use of 
Irrespective of the results of these measures,  they will not  enable the 
Rwandan  authorities to avoid having to  seek ways  of considerably increasing 
their agricultural production, and they are well aware  of this.  11The time 
has  come",  as is stated in the reference document  on  Rwanda's  food  strategy, 
"to initiate measures not  only to improve the productivity of a  system but 
also to change that  system". 
This change will be the transition from  subsistence production to market-
oriented production. 
In order for this transition to take place under  favourable  condi  tiona,  the 
following  st  epa must  be taken simultaneously: 
(i) the producer must  be guaranteed  stable and remunerative prices,  so 
that  he  can increase his productivity.  The  peasant will use external 
'inputs'  (fertilizer, etc.) only in so  far as he knows  they constitute a 
worthwhile investment; 
(ii) high-yield production  systems must  be developed which are light on 
imported inputs and make  optimum use of the manual  labour force. 
If this policy is successful, i.e. if production increases significantly, 
a  range of cohesive measures will have to be implemented to consolidate this 
success,  which might  otherwise be  short-lived and thus dash all the 
producers'  hopes.  The  three main  measures to be taken are as follows: 
•  arrangements  for the peasants to be given proper access  on  favourable 
terms to the necessary agricultural inputs and the results of applied 
research,  in order to improve productivity; 
•  improvement  of the trading channels,  in conjunction with the improvement 
of storage,  processing and the return on products; 
•  setting up  of an  appropriate credit  system. 
European  Community  support  for  Rwanda's  food  strategy would  seem to be 
justified for  two  reasons. 
<he  is that the Rwandese  authorities,  including the highest  echelons,  are 
perfectly aware  of the need to  embark upon this new policy.  The  broad 
lines of the policy are set  out  in their economic  and  social development 
plan,  and most  of their development  efforts are devoted to the rural sector. 
The  other reason is that the  Community  and its Member  States accol.Dlt  for 
some  60%  of the total aid received by  Rwanda,  and agricultural and rural 
development  absorbs  a.n  important  share of this Ebropean aid  ( 38%  of the 
fifth European Development  Fund). 
Ehrope's aid  should now  be channelled mainly into the following a.reasr -16-
(i) Continuation and  stepping up  of rural extension services through 
the  implementation of appropriate  programmes. 
(ii) Promotion of production and  efficient use of agricultural inputs. 
(iii) Restoring ground  cover  and  soil fertility. 
(iv)  Stepping up  and  channelling of research on improving productivity. 
(v) Efforts to raise efficiency of trading channels at both national 
and  regional levels. 
(vi)  Improvement  of the preservation and  market  value  of products. 
(vii) Setting up  of  an efficient credit  system corresponding to  the 
requirements  of small  family holdings. 
In order to ensure that  the whole  operation gets off the ground properly, 
a  coordination system must  be  set up.  An  EEC-Rwanda  working group  -
which  any other aid donors  could  join - has  already been set up  to work 
out the details of  such  cooperation. 
=========================================================================== 
TANZANIA  - A GENERAL  POLICY  REVIEW 
=========================================================================== 
Tanzania has  the potential to  be  self-sufficient in foodstuffs,  but, 
despite considerable external  aid  (one  of the highest per capita levels 
in the world) it has  ~ad difficulties with food  supplies for many years. 
Cereals  production fell from  1.6m  t  in 1978  to  1.3m  t  in 1980  and  food 
imports  have  more  than quadrupled over the  same  period.  The  resulting 
burden on the state budget  meant  that the necessary investment  could not 
be  made  to  encourage agricultural production.  The  rural  sector 
nevertheless  employs  8o%  of the  labour force. 
This poor performance is partly the result of wars  and  the vagaries of 
climate - but  only partly.  International experts,  like  many  members  of 
the Tanzanian Government,  think that it can also be  attributed to  the 
following: 
(i) the  lack of political incentives for agricultural development; 
(ii) failure to  conduct the right kind of research; 
(iii) the  cumbersome  procedures  and  mismanagement  of the many  semi-public 
bodies  and  in particular of the  National  Milling Corporation 
responsible for the production and  marketing of cereals; 
(iv)  the poor transport infrastructure. 
In 1981,  the Government,  realizing these difficulties,  launched its 
National  Economic  Survival Plan,  the objective being to boost 
agricultural production by financing irrigation projects,  introducing 
more  resistant  seeds, etc.  The  Government  is also in the  process  of 
preparing a  longer-term food  strategy. 
These  efforts on the part of the  Tanzanian authorities to give new 
impetus  to their agricultural development  can be  accompanied  by  a 
parallel effort  on  the part of the  Community,  which is contributing 3o% 
to 4o%  of the total aid granted to Tanzania.  It is still too  soon to 
determine  the exact  form  the  Community's  contribution is to  take,  as  the 
Tanzanians will have  to  give details of their own  policies first. - 17-
One  thing is certain:  this policy will have  no  hope  of success unless it 
provides  small  farmers with proper remuneration for their produce.  It 
is therefore necessary to introduce drastic reforms in the  semi-public 
organizations.  It will also be  necessary to  take  a  number  of 
supplementary  measures  to  guide,  back up  and  encourage this operation; 
the  establishment  of an agricultural inputs programme  and  credit  system, 
the  improvement  of storage facilities,  etc. 
ANNEXES 
The  other two  sections of the  Commission's  plan 
Definition of the  ECU - 1~-
I.  EMERGENCY  OPERATIONS 
The  aid granted by  the European Community  for  Third World  countries'  food 
strategies should therefore enable those countries to feed  themselves  and 
hence  no  longer  need  food  aid from  the developed  countries.  Edgard Pisani 
declared to the  European Parliament:  "This  food  aid is intended to  cope 
with  emergencies,  but  it must  contribute to its own  abolition,  for  lack of 
which,  in the  event  that it should perpetuate itself, it will probably 
create new  and  intolerable relationships of dependency.". 
The  emergency  operations advocated  by  the Commission  in its communication 
of 3 June  1982  concerning a  special  progrrunme  to  combat  hunger  in the world 
are designed to meet  a  different requirement,  since it is a  question of 
helping refugees  or displaced persons,  of whom  there is a  constant  flow  as 
a  result  of the  events  in Afghanistan,  Central  America,  southern Africa and 
the  Horn  of Africa.  These people - there  are  more  than four million of 
them!  - are  among  the worst  off in the world  and  are  almost  entirely 
dependent  on  external  aid  (food,  health,  clothing,  shelter) for their 
survival. 
The  Commission therefore  intends to mobilize  35m  ECU  for this category of 
people,  who  already receive aid amounting to  29m  ECU  from  the Community, 
and this will  help to  ensure the  survival  of over  3  million people  in 1982. 
II.  OPERATIONS  WITH  A SPECIFIC  THEME 
The  developing countries are  running the  serious risk of  a  dangerous 
deterioration of their natural assets,  which nevertheless have to  remain the 
basis of their growth.  If appropriate  corrective measures  are not  taken, 
their agricultural  base will gradually contract  over the years,  and  the 
whole  future  of their agricultural  and  food  production  system will thus be 
endangered.  The  pressure of  immediate requirements has  often made  the 
authorities of these  countries neglect the  need  to  conserve  or replenish 
resources  by  exploiting them  too  heavily.  Hence  a  decline in natural 
potential  (land,  water,  etc.)  or in plant  and  animal  life. 
For the European Community  it is a  matter  of  giving the authorities of  those 
countries which  are threatened resources which,  without  jeopardizing the 
short-term operations,  will  enable  them to  include  in their plans measures 
designed to  safeguard  and  develop their assets.  The  objective is to 
persuade  the population to modify  or  change what  are in some  cases deeply 
ingrained habits and  make  it take  into  account  the  environment  in which it 
finds itself.  These  measures must  be  defined precisely but  they must  also 
be  adaptable  so  that  adjustments  can be  made  for differences in social 
systems  and  habits,  and  even for  taboos.  They  must  take place in a 
national  context  since they  must  have  the weight  of  governmental  authority 
behind them.  Local  grassroots organizations - ranging from  women's 
organizations to  cooperatives - can nevertheless make  a  significant 
contribution to their formulation  and  execution. 
The  first four  themes  selected 
In order to  mark  the  importance  and  urgency  of these  operations,  and  so  as to 
impress  upon  the developing countries the need to  act,  and  act  quickly,  while 
also  informing them  of the  support  they  can  expect  from  the  Community,  the 
Commission  has  immediately proposed four  initial  schemes,  of  a  largely 
experimental  nature,  to  enable  a  more  substantial  programme  to  be  launched. - 19-
1.  Efficient use  of fuelwood 
Between  75%  and  95%  of the  energy available is wasted  when  wood  is used  in 
the traditional  w~, even though it is the  commonest  source  of energy in 
Africa.  The  poorest  people  are  obliged by  sheer necessity to destroy the 
forests. 
It is therefore necessary to  run a  number  of parallel  schemes  to make  the 
population - particularly the women  - aware of the  problem,  to motivate 
people  and  to disseminate  cooking methods  using economical  ovens. 
2.  Desertification control 
The  desert is gradually gaining ground  (over  2  000  metres  a  year).  It must 
be  stopped.  An  impressive range of measures is required for this campaign. 
The  Commission  considers that here  again there is an urgent  need  to 
undertake  certain schemes  now  - ones that  can  be  embarked  upon  at  short 
notice  and  which will  pave  the w~ for the  implementation of  a  longer-term 
policy:  the creation of  stocks of plant material in village nurseries  and 
the preparation of remote  sensing operations in order to gain a  more 
thorough knowledge  of the  ground  cover,  support for national  research 
programmes,  and the training of  skilled personnel. 
3.  Village water  engineering 
The  sinking of  a  well meets  an essential requirement  and  can trigger off a 
more  general  development  process  by  adapting human  behaviour  in dealing with 
basic needs.  It is not  j•1st  a  question of  creating a  water point - a 
prerequisite for survival  - but  of using this to  set  in train a  whole  social 
and  economic development  p~ocess. 
4.  Development  of  animal production 
Diseases  are  a  serious threat to  animal  production in vast  areas  of the 
world.  Efforts must  be  made  to eradicate them,  but  such efforts must  be 
followed  up  by  measures  designed to  improve  animal  nutrition and make 
better use  of  livestock for the purposes of  agricultural production.  To 
that  end,  the  Commission  wishes  to  undertake,  at  a  cost  of  some  10m  ECU,  a 
campaign tc  control  rinderpest,  another  campaign to  control the diseases 
caused by the tse tse fly,  and  lastly to  step up  the resources at the 
disposal  of research institutes. -20-
Definition of the ECU 
In accordance with Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3180/78  of 18  December  1978 1 
published in the Official Journal  of the European Communities  (No  L  379)  of 
30  December  1978,  the ECU  is defined  as the  sum  of the following amounts  of 










German  mark  1 
pound  sterling, 
French francs, 
Italian lira, 
Dutch  guilder, 
Belgian francs, 
Luxembourg  franc, 
Danish krone, 
Irish pound. 
The  equivalent  of the ECU  in any  currency is equal  to the  sum  of the 
equivalents in that  currency  of the  amounts  indicated above.  It is 
determined  by  the  Commission  of the European Communities  on  the basis of 
the daily  exchange market  rates. 
The  daily rates for conversion into the various national  currencies are 
available  every  d~;  they  are published at regular intervals in the 
Official  Journal  of the European  Communities. 
Any  change  in the  composition of the  ECU  decided  on  pursuant  to Article 2 
of Regulation  (EEC)  No  3180/78 is automatically  applicable to this 
definition. 
If the European :Monetary  System  as defined in the European Council 
Resolution  of 5 December  1978  were  to  cease to  exist  and/or if the ECU 
were  no  longer used  by  the European Monetary  Cooperation Fund,  the ECU 
i·muld  be  replaced  by  the  amounts  of the  currencies which make  it up 1 
fixed  by  the definition of the  ECU  in force  immediately  before its 
abandonment. 